China’s Urban Migration

In 2018, a documentary explored the phenomenon known as the “Exodus of 100 million farmers” in China (TVO, 2018). These farmers had left rural areas to congregate in densely populated city blocks alongside other rural migrants. Within China, they are essentially immigrants. Early communist policies designated them as farm workers to ensure food security by keeping them on the farms. Consequently, they lack the same rights as urban residents. Mario Castaneda, a professor of multicultural studies at Cal-State LA, visited China on an academic assignment and confirmed that “Chinese migrant workers find themselves in a situation similar to Latino migrant workers” (M. Castaneda, personal communication, June 11, 2020). Their reasons for leaving the farms mirror those of rural Latin Americans. The documentary explains that these workers seek access—especially for their children and ailing parents—to advanced healthcare and education available in cities. Like Latino migrants, many of them send money back to their families.

The “trade war” between President Trump and China underscored China’s significant role as an importer of soybeans and other food products. Despite having a landmass similar to that of the United States, only 12.7% of China’s land is suitable for farming (World Bank Group, 2020). However, China’s population exceeds that of the United States by over a billion (Internet World Stats, 2020).

The Struggle of China’s Rural Migrants: Balancing Hope and Reality

Small-scale farms in China face an uphill battle when competing against mass commercial production. Many armers eke out a meager existence, mirroring the struggles of small family farms in the United States. In both cases, a common thread emerges: their children increasingly gravitate toward urban centers. China’s younger rural migrants often find themselves toiling in sweatshops, enduring cramped and overcrowded conditions far from the support of family and their traditional communities. Despite their vulnerability to exploitation, they hold onto hope of earning enough to support their families and eventually achieving a better life.

However, the UN World Happiness Report reveals a poignant contrast: migrants in Chinese cities report lower happiness levels than those who remain in the countryside (Knight & Gunatilaka, 2018). The allure of urban amenities—advanced healthcare, education, and economic opportunities—draws these migrants away from their rural roots. Yet, once ensconced in the city, they grapple with the harsh realities.

In response to this complex situation, the Chinese government has embarked on an ambitious program. The government seeks to transform these rural migrants into urban residents and create new engines of consumption. Here’s how it unfolds:

This ambitious endeavor will be replicated across the country. Yet, as these rural migrants leave their homes and embrace the city lights, they must grapple with the stark realities of rural life that await them (TVO, 2018, para. 5).

The documentary portrays one family, forced out of a residential district, discovering their rural home in a state of utter disrepair. “It’s become desolate….The elementary school where he was going to send his daughter has been closed” (TVO, 2018, para. 7). Faced with this reality, they decide to take their chances by relocating to a smaller city, as per the government’s plan. To finance their move, they secure a loan against their farm property. However, upon arrival, they encounter rent prices that exceed their means. Their previously thriving restaurant business struggles to attract the necessary number of customers in the less populated location. The lesson about inadequacy of central planning has not been learned.

In contrast, another family has made a different choice. The narrator explains, “As long as they have this farmland, his family will be able to survive….They express their gratitude to their ancestors for leaving them this land.” The father stoically declares, “I’ve got my family. If we have food, that will be enough” (TVO, 2018, para. 15).

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